Documents de travail

Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources when Self-insurance is Available: an Experiment

N°: 
2011-07
Auteurs: 
M. Lefebvre

A laboratory experiment is used to analyze how the rule used to allocate a CPR in case of shortage impacts the individual trade-off between relying on a free but uncertain CPR and investing in a secure alternative resource, which constitutes a self-insurance. I compare three rules from the bankruptcy literature (contrained-equal awards, constrained-equal losses, proportional) and a rule that allocates no resource in case of shortage. I find that the best coordination institution towards the optimal level of self-insurance is the no allocation rule.

Consumer Responses to Various Nutrition ‘Front‐of‐Pack’ Logos -- A Framed Field Experiment

N°: 
2011-06
Auteurs: 
Muller, L. and Ruffieux, B.

In a laboratory experiment, we study consumer responses to 7 Nutrition
‘Front‐of‐Pack’ Logos. In addition to the Guideline Daily Amounts (GDA) logo, the six other logos vary according to three criteria: (i) Granularity (What object do we rate?

Experimental economics shows how food price policies may improve diet while increasing socioeconomic inequalities in nutrition

N°: 
2011-05
Auteurs: 
Darmon N., Lacroix A., Muller L., and Ruffieux B.

Objective: To compare the impact of food price policies on the nutritional quality of food baskets chosen by low-income and medium-income women
Methods: Experimental economics was used to simulate a fruit and vegetable price subsidy (FV policy) and a mixed policy subsidizing healthy products and taxing unhealthy ones(NP policy)Low-income (n=95) and medium–income (n=33) women selected a daily food basket at current prices and then at policy prices. Energy density (ED) and the mean adequacy ratio (MAR) were used as nutritional quality indicators.

Performance of the ambiant tax: does the nature of the damage matter

N°: 
2011-04
Auteurs: 
Nasreddine, A., Ennasri, A. and Willinger, M.

The ambient tax is often considered as an efficient instrument to achieve a …first best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator is less informed than the polluters. Since the ambient tax was never implemented in the fi…eld, empirical evidence is missing. Available experimental fi…ndings provide mixed evidence: efficiency is higher under external damage, i.e. if ambient pollution affects non-polluters (Spraggon, 2002, 2003)

Managerial incentives under competitive pressure: Experimental investigation

N°: 
2011-03
Auteurs: 
Ennasri, A. and Willinger, M.

We investigate the effects of competition on managerial incentives and effort in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers compensation to his manager in two different contexts: monopoly and Cournot duopoly. After accepting the compensation, the manager chooses an effort level to increase the probability of reduced costs of his firm. Theory predicts that the entry of a rival firm in a monopolistic industry affects negatively both the incentive compensation and the effort level.