Documents de travail

Vanishing leadership and declining reciprocity in a sequential contribution experiment

N°: 
2010-10
Auteurs: 
Figuières, C., Masclet, D. and Willinger, M.

We examine experimentally how and why voluntary contributions are affected by sequentiality. Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects observe the contributions from earlier decisions in each round ("sequential treatment with information") to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially within rounds but cannot observe earlier contributions ("sequential treatment without information").

Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments

N°: 
2010-09
Auteurs: 
Masclet, D., Noussair, C.N., Villeval, M.C.

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental
impact on group earnings in the short-run. Could the introduction of pre-play threats to
punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost
associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an

Respect as an Incentive

N°: 
2010-08
Auteurs: 
Eriksson, T. and Villeval, M.C.

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort. This experiment sheds light on the extent to which symbolic rewards are used, how they affect employees’ further effort, the duration of relationships, and the profits of employers.

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

N°: 
2010-07
Auteurs: 
Charness, G., Kuhn, P. and Villeval, M.C.

In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to

Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment

N°: 
2010-06
Auteurs: 
Cabrales, A., Charness, G. and Villeval, M.C.

We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power