Publications

Professional identity can increase dishonesty

Auteurs: 
Villeval M.C.
Pages: 
48-49

An experiment shows that although bank employees behave honestly on average, their dishonesty increases when they make decisions after having been primed to think about their professional identity.

The dark side of competition for status.

Auteurs: 
Charness, G., Masclet, D., Villeval, M.C.
Pages: 
38-55

Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one's performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by sabotaging others' work or by increasing artificially their own performance.

Is There One Unifying Concept of Utility? An Experimental Comparison of Utility under Risk and Utility over Time.

Auteurs: 
Abdellaoui M., Bleichrodt H., l'Haridon O. & Paraschiv C.
Pages: 
2153-2169

The nature of utility is controversial. Whereas decision theory commonly assumes that utility is context specific, applied and empirical decision analysis typically assumes one unifying concept of utility applicable to all decision problems. This controversy has hardly been addressed empirically because of the absence of methods to measure utility outside the context of risk. We introduce a method to measure utility over time and compare utility under risk and utility over time. We distinguish between gains and losses and also measure loss aversion.

Risk Aversion and Framing Effects

Auteurs: 
Lévy-Garboua L., Maafi H., Masclet D. & Terracol A.
Pages: 
128-144

We present a new experimental evidence of how framing affects decisions in the context of a lottery choice experiment for measuring risk aversion. We investigate framing effects by replicating the Holt and Laury’s (Am. Econ. Rev. 92:1644–1655, 2002) procedure for measuring risk aversion under various frames. We first examine treatments where participants are confronted with the 10 decisions to be made either simultaneously or sequentially. The second treatment variable is the order of appearance of the ten lottery pairs.