Documents de travail

When Allais meets Ulysses: Dynamic Axioms and the Common Ratio Effect

N°: 
2011-02
Auteurs: 
Nebout, A. and Dubois, D.

We report experimental findings about subjects' behavior in dynamic decision problems involving multistage lotteries with different timings of resolution of uncertainty. Our within-subject design allows us to study violations of the Independence axiom in the light of the dynamic axioms': Dynamic Consistency, Consequentialism and Reduction of Compound Lotteries. More precisely we investigate the extensions in a dynamic framework of the pattern of choices observed in the Common Ratio Effect (CRE).

Étude sur l'influence de divers systèmes d'étiquetage nutritionnel sur la composition du panier d'achat alimentaire

N°: 
2011-01
Auteurs: 
Ruffieux, B. and Muller, L.

A la demande du Ministère de la santé, nous avons, en recourant aux méthodes de l’économie expérimentale, mis en concurrence en termes d’efficacités nutritionnelles relatives, sept systèmes de labels des produits alimentaires.

Inequality and Riots – Experimental Evidence

N°: 
2010-13
Auteurs: 
Abbink, A., Masclet, D. and Mirza, D

We study the relationship between inequality and inter-groups conflicts (riots), focussing on social inequality. Disadvantaged societal groups experience discrimination and thus have limited access to some social and labour resources like education or employment. First, we experimentally investigate whether social inequality is a driving force of inter-group conflicts. Second, we investigate the factors that make preferences for riot translate into actions. Riots require coordination. Our experiment consists of a two-stage game.

Weak moral motivation leads to the decline of voluntary contributions

N°: 
2010-11
Auteurs: 
Figuières, C., Willinger, M. and Masclet, D.

We develop a model that accounts for the decay of the average contribution observed in experiments on voluntary contributions to a public good. The novel idea is that people’s moral motivation is "weak". Their judgment about the right contribution depends on observed contributions by group members and on an intrinsic "moral ideal". We show that the assumption of weakly morally motivated agents lead to the decline of the average contribution over time.