Documents de travail

To What Extent Would the Poorest Consumers Nutritionally and Socially Benefit from a Global Food Tax and Subsidy Reform? A Framed Field Experiment Based on Daily Food Intake

N°: 
2010-05
Auteurs: 
Lacroix, A., Muller, L. and Ruffieux, B.

In this paper we propose a new method in experimental economics, designed to evaluate the effectiveness of public policy incentives aimed at altering consumer behaviors. We apply this method to wide-ranging policies on food prices, which use subsidies to increase the consumption of healthy products and taxes to reduce that of unhealthy ones. Our protocol allows for observation of an individual’s daily food consumption before and after the policy. We examine two separate policies: the one subsidizes fruit and vegetables, while the other one combines taxes and subsidies.

Do Price-Tags Influence Consumers' Willingness to Pay? On External Validity Of Using Auctions for Measuring Values.

N°: 
2010-04
Auteurs: 
Muller, L. and Ruffieux, B.

This paper considers the external validity of the growing set of literature that uses laboratory auctions to reveal consumers’ willingness to pay for consumer goods, when the concerned goods are sold in retailing shops through posted price procedures. Here, the quality of the parallel between the field and the lab crucially depends on whether being informed of the actual field price influences a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good or not.

Competitive Preferences and Status as an incentive: Experimental Evidence

N°: 
2010-03
Auteurs: 
Charness, G., Masclet, D. and Villeval, M.C.

In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their status (rank). We find that people express both intrinsic motivation and a taste for status. Indeed, people increase their effort when they are simply informed about their relative performance, and people pay both to sabotage others’ output and to artificially increase their own relative performance.

Incentives Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects

N°: 
2010-02
Auteurs: 
Lefebvre, M., Vieider, F.M. and Villeval, M.C.

Most studies on the effect of incentives on risk attitude use within-subject designs. This may however raise an issue of sequentiality of effects as later choices may be influenced by earlier ones. This paper reports between-subject results on the effect of monetary stakes on risk attitudes for small probability prospects. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk seeking for small probabilities predicted by prospect theory. Under high stakes however risk seeking is dramatically reduced.

Do clubs foster provision success? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level public good.

N°: 
2010-01
Auteurs: 
Bchir, M.A. and Willinger, M.

We report the results of an experiment on the provision of a step-level collective good. We compare subjects’ behavior in a public good game and in a club good game. In the club good game, players who contribute less than the amount required to become a member, do not benefit from the collective good. Compared to the benchmark steplevel public good, we find that the introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects. It increases significantly the provision success of the collective good.